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I. INTRODUCTION
The number of Chinese applications for patents and trademarks has drastically increased
over the past ten years. 1 This increase in filings can be at least partially attributed to subsidy
programs offered to domestic applicants by the Chinese government. 2 These subsidies, offered
for both foreign and domestic intellectual property (“IP”) acquisitions, may have significant
consequences internationally. 3 This paper asserts that by backing these initiatives, China violates
the national treatment principles of the TRIPS Agreement and ignores its obligations under the
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. 4 Rather than expending their own
resources in attempting to solve the problems posed by the subsidized filings, World Trade
Organization (“WTO”) members should seek to enforce these international agreements and
curtail China’s continued violations.
II.

PATENT SUBSIDIES

In 2019, China filed the most international patent applications out of any other country in
the world. 5 In doing so, China ended the US’s streak of being the biggest user of the Patent
Cooperation Treaty’s (PCT) international patent filing system since its inception in 1978. 6
Similarly, as of 2019, China was the fourth largest user of the US patent system. 7 Even more

ǂ

Mitchell Hamline School of Law, 2021. For biographical information, see:
https://www.linkedin.com/in/taylorstemler/. I would like to thank Renee Kraft for providing the inspiration to write
on this topic and for all of her thoughtful feedback and guidance on this article. I would also like to thank the
Cybaris Law Review team for all their help editing. All errors are my own.
1
See infra Parts II and III.
2
Id.
3
See infra Sections II.A and III.A.
4
See infra Part IV.
5
China Becomes Top Filer of International Patents in 2019 Amid Robust Growth for WIPO’s IP Services, Treaties
and Finances, WIPO (April 7, 2020) [hereinafter China Becomes Top Filer],
https://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/articles/2020/article_0005.html#:~:text=With%2058%2C990%20applications%
20filed%20in,PCT%20began%20operations%20in%201978 [https://perma.cc/MM2T-B3XS].
6
Id.
7
The number of Chinese patent filings in the US came in just behind the US, Japan, and South Korea. See USPTO,
Patent Counts by Origin and Type, CALENDAR YEAR 2019[hereinafter PATENT COUNTS BY ORIGIN 2019],
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staggering is the dramatic rate of increase in Chinese filings at the USPTO, up 93% over the
previous 10 years. 8 Although China has experienced a significant period of technological growth
over the past decade, 9 one major factor to which the increase in Chinese patent filings has been
attributed is its patent subsidy program. 10
A.

Overview of China’s Current and Former Patent Subsidy Program
The number of patent applications filed and granted by a country has historically been

used as a metric for gauging that country’s level of innovation. 11 Although on its face, measuring
patenting activity would appear to be a logical way of gauging innovation, these measurements
can be distorted by other incentives driving parties to increase patent filings. One other incentive
may include, for example, signaling a company’s value to potential investors when seeking to
secure financing, as owning a large patent portfolio can provide an aura of legitimacy, regardless
of the strength of the constituent patents. 12 Governments may also wish to increase the amounts
of patent held by domestic entities for similar reasons. Increased patent activity within or from a
country may signal to others that the country is a hotbed of innovation, spurring an increase in
foreign direct investment. 13

https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/st_co_19.htm [https://perma.cc/T3JD-HHQX] (last visited May
27, 2021).
8
In 2009, 1,654 US patent applications originated from the People’s Republic of China. See USPTO, Patent Counts
by Country, State, and Year - Utility Patents, https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/cst_utl.htm
[https://perma.cc/T7SB-JQUB] (last visited May 27, 2021). In 2019, this number rose to 22,962. PATENT COUNTS
BY ORIGIN 2019, supra note 7.
9
Briony Harris, China Is an Innovation Superpower. This Is Why, WORLD ECON. F. (2018),
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/02/these-charts-show-how-china-is-becoming-an-innovation-superpower/
[https://perma.cc/EJ95-UF4Z].
10
USPTO, TRADEMARKS AND PATENTS IN CHINA 3 (2021) [hereinafter TRADEMARKS AND PATENTS IN CHINA].
11
K. Pavitt, Patent Statistics as Indicators of Innovative Activities: Possibilities and Problems, 7 SCIENTOMETRICS
77, 77 (1985).
12
Doug Robinson, 10 Reasons to Patent Your Startup’s New Invention, STARTUPNATION (Feb. 5, 2020),
https://startupnation.com/manage-your-business/patent-new-invention/ [https://perma.cc/8ZQY-X3NQ].
13
Foreign direct investment is generally attracted through developing strong domestic technological capacity and IP
rights. Given how technological capacity has historically been measured using patent filing activity, it is likely that
an increase in patent filing within a country would signal an increase in technological activity and foreign direct
investment. See Keith E. Maskus, Intellectual Property Rights and Foreign Direct Investment, (Ctr. for Int’l Econ.
Stud., Policy Discussion Paper No. 0022, 2000),
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To increase the number of patents held by domestic entities, China has created new
incentives to file patent applications in China and the rest of the world. Among the incentives are
reduced prison sentences, 14 tax breaks, 15 patent commercialization subsidies, 16 individual
housing benefits, 17 application filing and examination subsidies, 18 and subsidy awards for
granted patents. 19
Patent application and grant subsidies, the focus of this section, were first developed in
the late 1990s and have been launched in other provinces in China throughout the early 2000s. 20
Given that each Chinese province is responsible for its own patent promotion and enforcement, 21
the amounts of, and eligibility requirements for the subsidies vary by province. In some cases,
the subsidies cover the entire filing or examination fee for a given application. 22 According to the
US Patent and Trademark Office (“the USPTO”), many of the subsidies even provide financial
incentives greater than the cost of obtaining the patent itself. 23

https://www.iatp.org/sites/default/files/Intellectual_Property_Rights_and_Foreign_Direc.htm
[https://perma.cc/XSC5-BV6Z].
14
Kelsey Campbell-Dollaghan, Prisoners in China Can Get Out of Jail in Exchange for Patents, GIZMODO
(February 2, 2015), https://gizmodo.com/prisoners-in-china-can-get-out-of-jail-early-by-patent-1683159871
[https://perma.cc/J3RX-TACM].
15
Patent Subsidies to Boost R&D, AFD CHINA (2016) [hereinafter Patent Subsidies to Boost R&D],
https://www.afdip.com/index.php?ac=article&at=read&did=2557 [https://perma.cc/TQ9X-ERUG].
16
Id.
17
Patents, Yes; Ideas, Maybe, THE ECONOMIST (Oct. 14, 2020),
https://www.economist.com/business/2010/10/14/patents-yes-ideas-maybe [https://perma.cc/8EQS-9N23].
18
Patent Subsidies to Boost R&D, supra note 15.
19
Id. Interestingly, many of the Chinese patent subsidies mirror those provided by the Soviet Union for inventors
certificates under the Act Concerning Inventions and Technical Improvements. Among other things, the Soviet
incentives included access to priority accommodations, schools, and research positions. See Francis Hughes, Soviet
Invention Awards, 55 ECON. J. 291, 291–292 (1945).
20
Jianwei Dang & Kazuyuki Motohashi, Patent Statistics: A Good Indicator for Innovation in China? Patent
Subsidy Program Impacts on Patent Quality, 35 CHINA ECON. REV., 137, 140 (2015).
21
Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China (amended and promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s
Cong.) (Dec. 27, 2008), art. 22, https://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/cn/cn028en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5BDQ-QYJD] [hereinafter Patent Law of China].
22
Id.
23
TRADEMARKS AND PATENTS IN CHINA, supra note 10, at 7.
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For example, in Beijing, applicants could earn as much as 20 million yuan ($3 million
USD) in foreign patent subsidies in a given year. Interestingly, the per patent subsidy for an
applicant seeking a foreign patent, 50,000 yuan ($7,500 USD) is significantly higher than the
1,000 yuan ($150 USD) subsidy offered to an applicant seeking a domestic, Chinese patent. 24
Not only do Chinese cities offer attractive subsidies to applicants, but certain sub-city districts
also offer additional monetary subsidies to applicants that can be combined with the city level
subsidies.
Generally, to be eligible for a subsidy, the applicant must be either an enterprise, public
institution, governmental organization, or social organization registered within the city offering
the subsidy. 25 Thus, to qualify for a subsidy, the patent application must be owned by a Chinese
entity. 26 If the application is later assigned to a non-Chinese entity, the entire subsidy may be
revoked or required to be repaid. 27
Recently, the Chinese National IP Administration (“CNIPA”) announced a plan to cancel
or phase out all patent subsidies. 28 This change in policy was said to be an attempt to curb the
improper filing behavior of Chinese applicants and encourage the filing of higher quality
patents. 29 The announcement requires that all funding for patent application filing and

24
Id. Although the cost of obtaining a US patent (about $7,500 USD) is significantly higher than that of a Chinese
patent (about $950 USD), the discrepancy between the subsidies is far from proportional to the difference in costs of
patent acquisition between the two countries. See How Much Does a Patent Cost in Major Countries?, GREYB
(2020), https://www.greyb.com/patent-cost/ [https://perma.cc/DYU3-DK8L].
25
Haijun Jin, Yuli Tu & Shutong Wang, Government-Backed Patent Funds in China, 2013 TECH MONITOR 24, 25.
26
Jeremy Kriegel, Strategies to Leverage Chinese Patent Subsidies, INTELL. PROP. MAG. 78, 79 (2012).
27
Id.
28

Guójiā Zhīshì Chǎnquán Jú Guānyú Jìnyībù Yángé Guīfàn Zhuānlì Shēnqǐng Xíngwéi De Tōngzhī (国家知识产

权局关于进一步严格规范专利申请行为的通知) [Notice of the State Intellectual Property Office on Further
Strictly Regulating Patent Application Behavior], (promulgated by the China Nat’l Intell. Prop. Admin., Jan. 27,
2021), https://www.cnipa.gov.cn/art/2021/1/27/art_545_156433.html?xxgkhide=1 [https://perma.cc/25SZ-9UHW].
29
China to Cancel All Patent Subsidies, XINHUANET (Feb. 5, 2021), http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/202102/05/c_139724293.htm#:~:text=5%20(Xinhua)%20%2D%2D%20China%20plans,intellectual%20property%20(IP
)%20services [https://perma.cc/TZ3C-ZXMS].
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prosecution activities by Chinese provinces and the CNIPA be halted by June of 2021. 30
Although provinces are still permitted to provide subsidies for granted patents until 2025, these
subsidies must not exceed 50% of the official fees paid in obtaining the patent right. 31
Importantly, the notice does not apply to sub-provincial local IP departments and is not directed
to state agencies other than the CNIPA. 32 Thus, these other entities may be free to continue
disbursing patent subsidies despite the proposed change in policy. 33
B.

Effects of the Chinese Patent Subsidy Program
The USPTO has suggested that the Chinese subsidy programs have contributed to a

decrease in the commercial value of Chinese national patents. 34 In doing so, the USPTO cites the
proportionately low rate at which domestic Chinese national patent recipients file for
international patent protection. 35 In the US, 80% of US national patent applicants file for
international protection. 36 Comparatively, 5% of Chinese national patent applicants seek
international protection. 37 From this data, the USPTO concludes that Chinese applicants may
recognize the minimal value of the patent, which would provide only a minor return on
investment. 38 When considered with the fact that many Chinese patent subsidies for international
filings are contingent upon the granting of the international patent, it may be that Chinese
applicants are skeptical about the likelihood acquiring a patent right. This could be due to a

30

Id.
Id.
32
Mark Cohen, CNIPA’s Notice on Cancelling Patent Subsidies: A Deeper Dive, CHINA IPR, (February 15, 2021),
https://chinaipr.com/2021/02/15/cnipas-notice-on-cancelling-patent-subsidies-a-deeper-dive/
[https://perma.cc/NV5G-FYL7].
33
Id.
34
TRADEMARKS AND PATENTS IN CHINA, supra note 10, at 10.
35
Id.
36
Id. It is important to consider, however, that despite the relatively low percentage of Chinese national applicants
filing internationally, China is still the number one user of the PCT. China Becomes Top Filer, supra note 5.
37
Id. at 10.
38
Id.
31
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recognition that the discovery relates to an insignificant technical advancement or because of
prior difficulties seeking protection abroad when compared to experiences at Chinese patent
office. 39 However, the USPTO’s conclusion that Chinese patents are less valuable merely
because of the low rate of international filing could overlook the fact that much of the market for
Chinese innovation may be domestic. 40 Domestic applicants may just recognize the lack of
incentive to file abroad since so much of their market is located within China. 41 Therefore, using
the international filing rate as a value metric for Chinese patenting may be problematic.
A likely more direct measure of the value of subsidy-driven Chinese patents is their
successful commercialization. 42 Here, the USPTO notes that China lags behind other countries,
as the WIPO 2020 Global Innovation Index ranks China 44th in the measure of IP receipts as a
percentage of total trade. 43 Thus, the USPTO concludes that despite having received more
national patent applications than all other offices in the IP5 combined, 44 the licensing revenue
generated from these patents is underwhelming compared to the other offices in the IP5. 45
Although licensing may be a useful indicator, basing the value of Chinese patents solely off of
these numbers could overlook the fact that licensing is a relatively sophisticated medium of
patent commercialization. As a developing country, Chinese patentees may have yet to fully
appreciate the value in licensing their patent rights. The WIPO 2020 Global Innovation Index
ranks China fifth in high-tech net exports as a percentage of total trade. 46 Thus, China appears

39

Deli Yang, Pendency and Grant Ratios of Invention Patents: A Comparative Study of the US and China, 37 RSCH.
POL’Y, 1035, 1035 (2008).
40
Hong, Y., The Major Innovations of Chinese Economic Development Theories in the New Era, 1 CHINA
POLITICAL ECON. 13, 15–16 (2018).
41
Id. at 16.
42
TRADEMARKS AND PATENTS IN CHINA, supra note 10, at 10.
43
Id. at 9.
44
Id. at 3 n.2.
45
WIPO, GLOBAL INNOVATION INDEX 2020 239, 256, 272, 312, 337, 339 (2020) (ranking Japan and the US at 1st,
the United Kingdom at 8th, Germany at 17th, Korea at 18th, and China at 44th).
46
Id. at 239.
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able to extract value from its patents in ways other than licensing them, which could undermine
the USPTO’s suggestion that they are of poor quality. Still, regardless of what method of
valuation is used, researchers seem to agree that after enacting the subsidies, Chinese patent
quality has not kept up with the surge in patent filings. 47
Another effect of the patent subsidies is that firms may be splitting up inventions into
more patent applications. 48 Thus, when provided financial subsidies per application, firms
choose to file patents in an inefficient manner. In doing so, firms waste both administrative
patent office and firm resources while their innovation rate remains relatively unchanged.

49

Finally, increased domestic patenting may have a defensive effect internationally. Many
companies possess a certain amount of institutional knowledge that may not rise to the level of a
“patent worthy” discovery. Companies choose to forego patenting for various reasons. For
instance, if the discovery would be difficult to commercialize, companies may decide that the
return on investment in seeking patent protection is insufficient to recover the costs of seeking a
patent in the first place. 50 In this case, it may be economical for the firm to forego patenting or
try protecting the advance as a trade secret. If, however, the costs of obtaining patent protection
were lessened, or eliminated completely, companies may be more inclined to seek patent
protection over these types of discoveries.
Generally, undisclosed, private information cannot be used to invalidate or serve as a bar
to obtaining patent rights. 51 This is because the information is not known to the public. 52 If then,

47

See generally Dan Prud’homme, Chinese Patent Quantity and Patent Quality, and the Role of the State, in
EVALUATION OF CHINA’S INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME FOR INNOVATION (2017).
48
Zhen Lei, Zhen Sun, & Brian Wright, Are Chinese Patent Applications Politically Driven? 21 (2013 Organization
for Economic Co-operation and Development, Working Paper), https://www.oecd.org/site/stipatents/4-3-Lei-SunWright.pdf [https://perma.cc/KR4M-73FC].
49
Id. at 22.
50
See supra, note 39 and accompanying text.
51
See PATENT LAW OF CHINA, supra note 21, art. 22.
52
Id.
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Chinese entity A opted to forego patenting a discovery while failing to make a public disclosure,
and entity B attempted to obtain a Chinese patent on that discovery, Chinese entity A may be
unable to prevent entity B from doing so. 53
The above hypothetical may prove problematic in the eyes of some institutions, such as
the Chinese government, where entity B is a foreign enterprise. Patent protection allows one to
obtain monopoly profits from a market. 54 Generally, a domestic patent holder is more likely to
reinvest its monopoly profits within its domestic country instead of reinvesting other foreign
countries. 55 Conversely, a foreign patentee is more likely to reinvest more of these profits in a
foreign country. 56 Thus, generally speaking, granting patents to a foreign entity may result in that
entity extracting monopoly profits from the granting country using the patent right, and
reinvesting these profits overseas. 57
In another hypothetical, if Chinese entity A were to instead have gotten a patent on the
discovery that it might have otherwise chosen not to disclose, entity B would be foreclosed from
obtaining a Chinese patent on the discovery. 58 At the same time, entity A’s Chinese patent would
serve as worldwide prior art. 59 Because of this prior art affect, entity B may also face difficulty
patenting this discovery in another foreign country. 60 Thus, Chinese entity A would hold an

53

However, entity A would likely still be allowed to use the patented technology as a prior user. See PATENT LAW

OF CHINA, supra note 21, art. 69.
54
RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 195-99

(2d ed. 1977).
See Carl R. Moy, History of the Patent Harmonization Treaty, 26 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 457, 475 (1993).
56
See Id.
57
See FRITZE MALCHUP, AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM, PATENT STUDY NO. 15 OF THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY OF THE UNITED
STATES SENATE 55, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1958).
58
PATENT LAW OF CHINA, supra note 21, art. 22.
59
What is Prior Art?, EUR. PATENT OFF. (Sept. 15, 2015), https://www.epo.org/learning/materials/inventorshandbook/novelty/prior-art.html [https://perma.cc/73LE-ZDGB].
60
Whether a foreign patent office is likely to cite a Chinese patent application as prior art during prosecution is
another story. Still, in most countries, the Chinese patent application could serve as invalidating prior art to a foreign
patentee seeking to assert their rights in the invention. CERTAIN ASPECTS OF NATIONAL/REGIONAL PATENT LAWS,
WIPO (2020).
55
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exclusive monopoly in the Chinese market, thereby preventing the situation where a foreign
entity exports monopoly profits from the Chinese market. Meanwhile, entity A retains its ability
to compete in the foreign market, thereby ensuring that Chinese entity A has the opportunity to
export profits from the foreign marketplace back to China.
Evidence of this theory’s application in the development of the Chinese subsidy policy is
lacking, and it is unlikely that this defensive effect served as a major goal behind enacting the
subsidies. However, at least one study has found evidence of Chinese protectionism in the
prosecution of patents in China, it was careful to note that this effect only appeared in
technological areas of strategic importance. 61 Considering these findings, it’s at least plausible
that China may be interested in restricting the growth of foreign patenting, at least in some
technological areas. This paper does not suggest that the Chinese subsidies are the sole, or even a
major cause of any fluctuations in rate of patents granted to foreign applicants. Nor does it
suggest that these policies have even been effective in restricting foreign patenting. Still, based
on the theoretical considerations outlined above it’s possible that they have some incremental
effect. To be sure, China does have an incentive to roll back the subsidies to focus applicants on
increasing patent quality. 62 Still, because of the theoretical potential protectionist effect, China
may also have an incentive to re-institute or halt the additional the elimination of these programs.
This is because, by incentivizing domestic patenting by Chinese entities, China may effectively
decrease the likelihood of monopoly profits being exporting by foreign patent holders while
increasing the likelihood of imported profits from Chinese firms competing abroad.

61

Gaétan de Rassenfosse & Emilio Raiteri, Technology Protectionism and the Patent System: Evidence from China
29 (Innovation and Intell. Prop. Pol’y, Working Paper No. 11, 2020),
62
Paolo Beconcini & Elisa Li, New Procedures Indicate China’s Patent System is Now Focused on Quality, not
Quantity, of Patents, SQUIRE PATTON BOGGS (Feb. 14, 2021), https://www.iptechblog.com/2021/02/newprocedures-indicate-chinas-patent-system-is-now-focused-on-quality-not-quantity-of-patents/
[https://perma.cc/RVE9-6D2B] (noting that this change in policy was said to be an attempt to curb the improper
filing behavior of Chinese applicants and encourage the filing of higher quality patents),
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III.

TRADEMARK SUBSIDIES

Chinese trademark subsidies are just as troubling, if not more, than its patent subsidies.
The increase in the number of trademark applications filed in China is staggering, with China’s
trademark office recording 92% more trademark applications in 2018 than the US, the next
leading office. 63 Not only have these subsidies contributed to an explosion in the number of
trademark applications filed by Chinese applicants in China, 64 but they have also yielded a large
uptick in the amount of Chinese filings in the US. While US national filings from domestic
applicants doubled between 2008 and 2018, US filings submitted by Chinese applicants
increased thirty-one fold during that same period. 65 In 2020, the number of Chinese trademark
applicants surpassed US applicants at the USPTO for the first time. 66
A.

Overview of China’s Current and Former Trademark Subsidy Program
Since at least the mid-2000s, China has maintained a subsidy program to incentivize

applicants to secure trademark protection both in China and abroad. 67 As of 2021, localities
within China have adopted over 70 trademark subsidy measures. 68 The USPTO continues to
caution that China is increasing its incentives for Chinese entities registering trademarks
abroad. 69

63

WIPO, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INDICATORS 2019 90 (2019). When adjusted for population, the
statistics are only slightly less striking, with China recording 62% more trademark applications. Id.
64
Id. The vast majority of applicants were residents of China. Id.
65
Compare WIPO, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INDICATORS 2010 86 (2010), with id. at 96.
66
Bridget Diakun, China Overtakes American Brand Owners to be Largest Source of Trademark Applications at the
USPTO, WORLD TRADEMARK REV. (Oct. 9, 2020), https://www.worldtrademarkreview.com/ip-offices/chinaovertakes-american-brand-owners-be-largest-sources-of-trademark-applications-the-uspto-data-analysis
[https://perma.cc/UTC9-4MBN].
67
World Trade Organization, New and Full Notification Pursuant to Article XVI:1 of the GATT 1994 and Article
25 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, WTO Doc. G/SCM/N/95/CHN/Suppl.1, 98–99
(2016).
68
TRADEMARKS AND PATENTS IN CHINA, supra note 10, at 3.
69
Id. n.11.
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In many instances, Chinese trademark subsidies outweigh the costs of filing a trademark
application in the US. For example, in 2013, Shenzhen Province in China authorized subsidies
for filing trademarks internationally. 70 Eligibility for these subsidies generally depends on
residence or corporate registration within the city granting the subsidy. 71 In Shenzhen, the
amount of the subsidy varies depending on where in the world the trademark application is being
filed. 72 For applications registered in the U.S., an applicant is awarded RMB 5,000 (about $760
USD). Meanwhile, as of 2015, the cost to file a trademark application with the USPTO has
hovered around $250. 73 Thus, under subsidy programs like the one in Shenzhen, it becomes
economically rational for a Chinese entity to file for trademark rights in the US even if they have
no intention of using the mark. 74
As of 2019, Shenzhen Municipal Administration for Market Regulation announced that it
would be lowering its subsidies available for applicants filing in the U.S. and other foreign
countries to RMB 1,000 (approximately $150 USD). 75 Likewise, in January of 2020, the CNIPA

70

Shēnzhèn Shì Shìchǎng Jiāndū Guǎnlǐ Jú Guānyú Yìnfā Shēnzhèn Shì Zhīshì Chǎnquán Zhuānxiàng Zījīn Guǎnlǐ

Bànfǎ——Zhuānlì Shēnqǐng Zīzhù Děng Bā Gè Cāozuò Guīchéng De Tōngzhī (深圳市市场监督管理局关于印发
深圳市知识产权专项资金管理办法——专利申请资助等八个操作规程的通知) Intell. Prop. Prot. Ctr., Oct. 13,
2014) [hereinafter Shenzhen Patent Application Funding], art. 12,
http://www.sziprs.org.cn/zcfg_65898/xgzc_70319/201410/t20141013_2595113.htm [https://perma.cc/V2NP-PVC8]
[notice of the Shenzhen Municipal Administration of Market Supervision on the Issuance of the Shenzhen
Municipal Intellectual Property Special Fund Management Measures-Eight Operating Procedures including Patent
Application Funding] (promulgated by China (Shenzhen)).
71
Id. art. 2. In some instances, foreign companies appear able to register their company in Shenzhen, in which case,
it may be possible for a foreign company to be granted a subsidy. Bobby Lee, The Process of Registering a WFOE
in Shenzhen, HONGDA (Dec. 5, 2016), https://www.hongdaservice.com/blog/the-process-of-registering-a-wfoe-inshenzhen [https://perma.cc/V4SK-X47W].
72
Josh Gerben, Massive Wave of Fraudulent US Trademark Filings Likely Caused by Chinese Government
Payments, GERBEN, https://www.gerbenlaw.com/blog/chinese-business-subsidies-linked-to-fraudulent-trademarkfilings/ [https://perma.cc/TF9M-NCUT]. Interestingly, trademark subsidies range from RMB 10,000 per registration
in the European Union IP Office and the Organization for IP in Africa to RMB 1,000 per registration in Hong Kong.
Id.
73
Trademark Fee Information, USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/trademark-fee-information
[https://perma.cc/7JT4-DCGQ].
74
TRADEMARKS AND PATENTS IN CHINA, supra note 10, at 3.
75
Shì Shìchǎng Jiānguǎn Jú Guānyú Yìnfā “Shēnzhèn Shì Shìchǎng Jiāndū Guǎnlǐ Jú Zhīshì Chǎnquán Lǐngyù
Zhuānxiàng Zījīn Cāozuò Guīchéng” De Tōngzhī (市市场监管局关于印发《深圳市市场监督管理局知识产权领

39

Cybaris®, An Intellectual Property Law Review

announced a plan to clean up, and in some instances eliminate, subsidies for IP. However, just a
few months later, the Chinese government directed its state-owned enterprises to increase their
international filings by 50%. 76 In stating this goal, China cited the need to promote innovation
and creativity. 77 To meet these goals, Chinese subnational governments will need to continue to
increase the availability of subsidies and other non-market incentives. 78
As an aside, regardless of how Chinese subsidies for trademark applications are handled
in the future, the incentive for Chinese applicants to file US trademark applications in the US
may remain unchanged. Amazon, almost a government in its own right, now provides
preferential treatment to sellers who can demonstrate proof of a registered trademark. 79 For many
sellers who sell inexpensive everyday objects, building a brand is unimportant to the success of
their operation. 80 Thus, all that matters to these sellers is to secure a registered trademark that
they can submit to Amazon and use to gain admission into its preferred Brand Registry
program. 81 Given that nearly half of Amazon’s top sellers are based in China, 82 and that many of

域专项资金操作规程》的通知) [Notice of the Municipal Market Supervision Bureau on Issuing the “Operational
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Administration”] (promulgated by the City of Qianhai Authority, Nov. 27, 2019) [hereinafter Notice on Special
Funds], art. 10, http://qh.sz.gov.cn/sygnan/xxgk/xxgkml/zcfg/szsfg/content/post_6843649.html
[https://perma.cc/3SVJ-46VR].
76
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展的指导意见》的通知) [State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State-Owned
High-Quality Development of Intellectual Property Work in Central Enterprises Notice of Guiding Opinions]
(promulgated by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, Feb. 26, 2020),
http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2020/content_5515287.htm [https://perma.cc/3C5W-WPVU].
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https://advertising.amazon.com/blog/brand-registry [https://perma.cc/TMD4-D4A8] (noting that the policy will help
sellers improve the accuracy of their listings and help customers find products).
80
McLaughlin, supra note 81, at 1805.
81
Id.
82
John Herrman, All Your Favorite Brands, From BSTOEM to ZGGCD, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2020
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/11/style/amazon-trademark-copyright.html.

40

Cybaris®, An Intellectual Property Law Review

these Chinese sellers thrive in low-cost market, it is possible that this increase in Chinese
applications is here to stay.
B.

Effects of the Chinese Trademark Subsidy Program
It is difficult to say exactly how much of the increase in Chinese trademark applications

in the US is attributable to Chinese subsidies or the seller incentives provided by Amazon. 83 For
the purposes of this paper, no attempt will be made to parse out the effects attributable to one
incentive or the other. Rather, the effects of the increase in Chinese filings will be examined
more generally under the assumption that both incentives contribute to this phenomenon.
With this huge increase in demand for US trademarks by Chinese applicants, some
attorneys have carved out a specialty in serving these clients. 84 However, although it keeps US
attorneys employed, this influx in Chinese applications may prove problematic for the US
trademark system. Some of the Chinese applications merely seek to protect random strings of
English character letters that have nothing to do with the goods or services with which they are
applied for. 85 In other cases, applicants seek protection over random combinations of English
language words. Often, these marks are successfully registered, as US trademark law recognizes
marks that have nothing to do with the goods with which they are classified, as fanciful or
arbitrary. 86 Fanciful and arbitrary marks are especially strong and are typically easier to register
than other marks that are suggestive or descriptive of the products with which they relate. 87
The US requires actual use, or an intent to use the mark before one is entitled to register a
trademark. Many trademark users opt to plan ahead and secure registration on an intent to use

McLaughlin, supra note 81, at 1805–06.
Diakun, supra note 67. The leading attorney representing Chinese clients before the USPTO filed 9,922 trademark
applications in 2020, which equates to more than 27 applications per day. Id.
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83
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basis, as it this allows them to secure priority over their mark early on. The applicant is then later
required to submit proof of their use of the mark. This is typically done by submitting a photo to
the USPTO, which is called a “specimen.” Alternatively, if one is already using the mark, they
can apply for trademark protection with a use-based application, in which they can submit a
specimen with their application.
In many cases, Chinese applicants fraudulently claim use of the mark based on doctored
specimens submitted to the USPTO. 88 For example, the same picture of a pair of shoes with a
photoshopped tag sporting the candidate mark could be reused for multiple different trademark
applications. 89 Interestingly, almost always, these fraudulent specimens are submitted with
marks registered in conjunction with apparel goods or scientific instruments on a use-based
application. 90 One study has found that 66.9% of these use-based applications for apparel goods
included fraudulent specimens, of which 38.9% proceeded to be registered by the USPTO. 91
Once these applications are registered by the USPTO, the applicant can then apply for Chinese
subsidies or seek admission to Amazon’s Brand Registry program.
This large influx of fraudulent marks imposes serious administrative burdens on the
USPTO. 92 The surge in filings has significantly bogged down trademark examiners and has
caused the USPTO to look into increasing their hiring. 93 It is unclear how these applications will
impact the USPTO in the long term, as much of the USPTO’s budgeting is based on the
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expectation that owners will renew their marks and pay additional fees. 94 In the likely case that
many of these marks go unrenewed, this could lead to a significant gap in the USPTO budget. 95
These fraudulent marks also harm US trademark stakeholders. The massive influx of
bogus Chinese trademark applications exacerbate the problem of trademark depletion, which
creates obstacles for those attempting to register and use legitimate trademarks. 96 Trademark law
rests on the assumption that there is an unlimited supply of potential trademarks. 97 However,
quite the opposite is true. 98 Nearly all the words that Americans use on a daily basis are now
registered or are confusingly similar to a registered mark. 99 Because of this, new applicants are
forced to seek longer, more complex, and less effective marks. 100 As more fraudulent marks are
registered, this issue of trademark depletion continues to worsen as the number of viable
trademarks continues to decrease. 101
Furthermore, to protect their existing trademark rights, US trademark owners must
enforce their marks against later infringers. A failure to do so could result in the erosion of the
trademark holder’s trademark rights. 102 Many trademark owners use monitoring services to look
out for any confusingly similar marks that new applicants are seeking to register. 103 Once an
application for a confusingly similar mark is filed, the owner must then oppose the mark or run
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the risk of the new applicant impinging the owner’s rights. These proceedings to oppose marks
can be expensive, especially when they become more frequent due to the large number of
fraudulent applicants. 104 Thus, companies seeking to maintain their rights are forced to expend
significant resources doing so. This may also serve to diminish the perceived value in owning a
US trademark as these rights become more expensive and difficult to maintain.
Partly in reaction to the negative effects of this influx of Chinese registrations, the
USPTO sought to combat the issue by requiring foreign applicants to engage US attorneys and
provide an email address for each application. 105 Still, likely because of the willingness of US
attorneys to serve this massive demand, 106 along with the ease of obtaining an email address,
Chinese filings continued to increase. 107 In December 2020, the US enacted the Trademark
Modernization Act of 2020 (“TMA”). 108 The TMA called for the USPTO to implement
procedures to allow third parties to challenge pending applications and suspicious
registrations. 109 Although the TMA does equip parties to challenge certain applications or
registrations, it still requires trademark owners to expend their own resources doing so and lacks
any means of prospectively addressing the large influx of Chinese applications. 110
Others have proposed prospective solutions for how the USPTO ought to address this
issue. One solution is to institute a trademark bar, similar to the USPTO’s patent bar, where
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practitioners must register with the USPTO to practice in front of the office. 111 Doing so could
make it easier for the USPTO to crack down on practitioners who file trademark applications for
clients who submit fraudulent specimens. 112 This would likely put some of the onus on
practitioners to scrutinize the filing and would filter out some of the most egregious
applications. 113
Another suggestion is to enlist a specialized examining unit trained to spot and flag
fraudulent applications. 114 Similar measures have been taken in the cannabis space, where the
USPTO maintains a specialized unit of examining attorneys assigned to handle cannabis related
filings. 115 This unit seeks to assist applicants in registering trademarks for cannabis related
products, while not allowing registration of marks for federally illegal cannabis itself. 116 Like
the cannabis examining unit, a specialized fraud detection unit could be trained to handle risky
applications and detect fraudulent specimens. 117 One possibility here is to assign all incoming
Chinese applications to this specialized unit. Ironically, however, doing so would likely violate
international treaties like the TRIPS Agreement—the very same agreement which this paper
argues some of the Chinese subsidies violate. 118 A more viable solution would be to assign this
unit all incoming use-based trademark applications in the apparel or scientific instrument
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classifications. Given that most of the fraudulent applications appear in this category, it seems
likely that such an approach could screen out most of these problem applications.
Finally, other suggestions include gathering more information about foreign applicants’
eligibility for government subsidies, requiring the USPTO to make a more in-depth inquiry about
applicants’ use in commerce, or provide an incentive (or subsidy) for successful challenges or
marks at the USPTO. 119 One commentor even suggests mobilizing US law school IP clinics to
challenge specious trademark claims using the third-party opposition system created by the
TMA. 120 While potentially effective, all of the approaches above require additional effort and
expense for US shareholders or the US government. Therefore, a more efficient approach to
addressing issues caused by the Chinese subsidies may be to challenge the subsidies themselves,
rather than the individual applications they help create.
IV.
A.

TREATMENT OF CHINESE SUBSIDIES UNDER WTO TRADE RULES

Overview of Relevant International Agreements and the National Treatment Principle
One of the most important international agreements in existence is the General

Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”). 121 Originally implemented in 1948, the GATT is the
foundation for many other multilateral trade agreements. 122 The GATT generally applies to
international regulations pertaining to trade in goods. 123 One of the basic principles that each
country agrees to in signing onto the GATT is the principle of national treatment. 124 Under this
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principle, in the context of international trade, member countries are not permitted to tax,
regulate, or enact other laws which afford protection to domestic products. 125 The national
treatment rule endorsed by the GATT is, however, limited by several enumerated exceptions. 126
Among the specific exceptions is that “[t]he provisions of this Article shall not prevent the
payment of subsidies exclusively to domestic producers . . . .” 127 The reason for this exception is
said to be a recognition of subsidies as an important governmental policy tool. 128
Still, in recognition that subsidies may have a negative impact on trade, the WTO
member countries enacted an additional Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
(“SCM”). 129 The SCM limits the general permissibility of subsidies under the GATT and further
defines which types of subsidies are to be permitted and prohibited. 130 The SCM defines a
subsidy as any (i) financial contribution, (ii) by a government within a member country, (iii)
which confers a benefit. 131 If a government action qualifies as a subsidy, the SCM prohibits the
subsidy if, for example, it is “contingent . . . upon export performance.” 132 The definition of
export performance under the SCM is intentionally broad and includes cases where the facts
demonstrate that the subsidy is “tied to actual or anticipated exportation or export earnings.” 133
The GATT refers to IP rights only briefly in one section. 134 Understanding the need to
provide minimum substantive legal protections for IP internationally, members of the WTO
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developed the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS
Agreement”). 135 Under this agreement, countries agree to implement minimum standards for IP
protection and enforcement. 136 Among other types of IP, the TRIPS Agreement applies to both
patents and trademarks. 137
Like the GATT, the TRIPS Agreement also requires adherence to the rule of national
treatment. 138 Under this principle, member countries are not permitted to treat member country
nationals any less favorably than its own nationals with regard to IP protection. 139 “Protection,”
as it is defined in the TRIPS Agreement includes “the availability, acquisition, scope,
maintenance, and enforcement of intellectual property rights . . . .” 140 Put more simply, the
national treatment clause in the TRIPS Agreement prohibits discrimination between nationals of
a member’s own country and nationals of another member’s country in regards to securing or
enforcing IP rights. 141 This national treatment principle serves the important purpose of
eliminating domestic barriers to IP protection between WTO members. 142 Unlike the GATT, the
TRIPS Agreement provides only for very limited and specific deviations from the national
treatment rule. 143
B.

Chinese IP Subsidies Under the SCM and TRIPS Agreements

135

KEVIN J. HICKEY, NINA M. HART, BRANDON J. MURRILL & KEVIN T. RICHARDS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46532,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY VIOLATIONS AND CHINA 15 (2020); General Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C,
1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
136
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 141.
137
See id. part II.5 and part II.2.
138
GATT, supra note 127, art. III.
139
Id.
140
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 141 n.3.
141
Overview: the TRIPS Agreement, WTO,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel2_e.htm#:~:text=The%20TRIPS%20Agreement%20is%20a,own
%20legal%20system%20and%20practice [https://perma.cc/UF6B-DXA2].
142
2017 REPORT, supra note 134, pt. II at 13.
143
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 141, art. 3.

48

Cybaris®, An Intellectual Property Law Review

China is a member of the WTO and is party to the GATT, SCM and TRIPS
Agreements. 144 Thus, under these agreements, China is required both to abide by the national
treatment principle enunciated in the TRIPS Agreement and to refrain from providing prohibited
subsidies under the SCM. 145 In enacting its subsidies for patent and trademark applications
domestic and abroad, China likely violates its obligations under both the SCM and the TRIPS
Agreement.
i.

The SCM Agreement Violation

By offering subsidies to Chinese applicants contingent on their acquisition of foreign IP
rights, China likely violates article 3.1(a) of the SCM. 146
1.

The Chinese IP Subsidies Qualify as “Subsidies” under the SCM

As noted before, 147 Article 1.1 of the SCM defines a subsidy as a (i) financial
contribution, (ii) by a government within a member country, (iii) which confers a benefit. 148
Here, the cash payments provided by the Chinese government to Chinese nationals for their
acquisition of foreign IP rights qualify as subsidies. First, a financial contribution has been
defined by WTO Appellate Bodies as a transfer of economic resources by the grantor. 149 Here,

144

Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/amendment_e.htm
[https://perma.cc/5EDN-AWMR] (listing China as a signatory to the TRIPS Agreement);
Trade Guide: WTO Subsidies Agreement, INT’L TRADE ADMIN. https://www.trade.gov/trade-guide-wto-subsidies
[https://perma.cc/Y3J3-YRC3 ] (noting all WTO members are parties to the SCM); Understanding the WTO: The
Organization, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm [https://perma.cc/9H4532AU ] (listing China as a member of the WTO).
145
See generally SCM, supra note 135 and TRIPS Agreement, supra note 141.
146
The US has questioned earlier versions of these Chinese subsidy programs under article 3.1(a) of the SCM. See
World Trade Organization, Questions from the United States Regarding the Sub-Central New and Full Notification
of China 8, WTO Doc. G/SCM/Q2/CHN/69 (2017).
147
See supra Section IV.A.
148
See SCM, supra note 135, art. 1.1
149
Mel Annand, Donald F. Buckingham & William A. Kerr, Export Subsidies and the World Trade Organization 5,
(Estey Ctr. for L. & Econ. in Int’l Trade, Research Paper No. 1, 2001) (referencing Appellate Body Report, Canada
– Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk

49

Cybaris®, An Intellectual Property Law Review

the cash payments provided to applicants by the Chinese government represent a transfer of
economic resources, Chinese currency, by the grantor, the Chinese government. 150 Second, many
of the cash payments are offered by Chinese provincial governments, 151 which are governments
within China—a member country of the WTO. 152 Third, the benefit provision of the SCM has
been interpreted to require that a recipient receive a financial contribution on terms more
favorable than the open market. 153 Here, the cash payments from China render foreign IP filings
by applicants receiving the payments cheaper than if they were to file from another country.
Given that the Chinese payments meet the requirements under article 1.1 of the SCM, they
qualify as subsidies under the agreement.
2.

The Chinese Subsidies Are De Facto Export Subsidies

Next, the subsidies provided by China to Chinese applicants filing abroad are prohibited
under the SCM insofar as they are contingent on export performance. 154 Such prohibited export
subsidies may be either de jure export subsidies, or de facto export subsidies. 155 De jure export
subsidies occur when the subsidy is contingent in law on export performance, based on the words
of the relevant legislation. 156 De facto export subsidies, are inferred from the totality of the
surrounding facts. 157 The difference between de facto and de jure export subsidies has been
described as “what evidence may be employed to prove that a subsidy is export contingent.” 158
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Here, the Chinese legislation only provides for subsidies where applicants seek or obtain foreign
patent protection and does not explicitly require exportation of goods or services. 159 Thus, the
legislation alone would likely be insufficient evidence to prove that the subsidies are de jure
export subsidies contingent on export performance. 160 Instead, the Chinese subsidies should be
analyzed under de facto export subsidy law and should be examined in light of the surrounding
facts.
3.

The De Facto Export Subsidies Are Prohibited under Article 3.1(a) of the
SCN

This contingency requirement has been interpreted by the Canada—Aircraft Appellate
Body to require that there be (i) a granting of a subsidy, (ii) that is tied to, (iii) anticipated export
earnings. 161 Regarding the Chinese subsidies, the first element is met, insofar as the Chinese
government grants a subsidy by providing domestic applicants monetary payments that meet the
requirements of Article I:1 of the SCM, as discussed above.
Next, skipping to the third element, the subsidies were granted in anticipation of export
earnings. The Appellate Body in Canada—Aircraft clarified that the “meaning of the word
‘anticipated’ is ‘expected.’” 162 Acquiring IP rights generally confers the exclusive rights to use,
exclude, license, or sell using a particular trade name or technology within the granting
country. 163 In some cases, such as in the Amazon Brand Registry Program, US trademark owners
even are given preferential treatment and exclusive promotion to customers. 164 Although some
IP rights may be more valuable than others, working the foreign patent or trademark can be
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expected to provide financial earnings to the owner in the form of increased sales or profits. 165
These financial earnings may be derived from products exported from China, in which case the
exports are driven by the underlying IP right. 166 Thus, one could likely expect to incur such
export earnings as a result of the patent or trademark protection, paid for by the Chinese subsidy.
In Canada—Aircraft, the Panel also elaborated on the meaning of “export performance”
by distinguishing “export performance” from “technological benefits to Canada.” 167 In
Canada—Aircraft, a project’s subsidy was conditioned on the technological benefits provided to
Canada. 168 The Panel acknowledged that some of the projects with higher technological and
economic benefits may indeed yield an increase in an exports or export earnings. 169 However,
the technological benefits could not be considered synonymous with export performance, given
that they lacked information for the grantors to select projects on the basis of export
performance. 170
Although one might analogize these subsidies to the Chinese IP subsidies, the two are
distinguishable. While the Canada—Aircraft subsidies were conditioned on technological
benefits to Canada, 171 the Chinese subsidies are conditioned on procurement of an IP right in the
US. 172 Utilization of the technological benefits to Canada may or may not result in increased
export performance. 173 The technological benefits could be retained solely within Canada and
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provide for the benefit to Canada without ever being exported. Thus, the technological benefits
to Canada have independent value aside from their export potential. Working the foreign-owned
US IP right, on the other hand, results in export earnings from increased sales generated by the
competitive advantage conferred by the US IP right. Unlike the technological benefits to Canada,
these foreign IP rights generally lack any value aside from the competitive advantage they
provide in the US marketplace. 174 Whereas Canada sought to subsidize anything providing
technological benefits to itself, regardless of whether it is exported, under this measure, China
only subsidizes procurement of the competitive advantage, in the form of an IP right, in the US.
By only subsidizing the procurement of this increased ability to compete in the US marketplace,
China effectively only “select[s] projects on the basis of increased export performance.” 175
Admittedly, a strong counterargument exists to the contention that the procurement of US
IP rights can be synonymous with export performance. The argument here would be that
regardless of whether the IP right turns out to be profitable and therefore actually leads to export
performance, the subsidy for its procurement is still granted. Thus, because there is no penalty or
revocation of the subsidy for failing to profitably work the IP right, in some cases, the subsidy
would be granted despite the lack of any export performance. This argument has been considered
and rejected by at least one WTO Panel. 176 Although the Panel agreed that the argument had
merit regarding actual export earnings, the argument fails to rebut the prima facie showing that a
subsidy would not have been granted but for anticipated export earnings. 177 Thus, because
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Chinese subsidized IP rights yield anticipated export earnings, the fact that they do not penalize
applicants who’s rights do not ultimately produce export profits is not fatal to this analysis.
Another potential counterargument may be that a Chinese owner of a US IP right need
not necessarily produce the protected product in China. They could have the product made in the
US and collect earnings on the product without ever having exported it into the US. This
argument fails for two reasons. The first is a practical point. Comparatively speaking, Chinese
manufacturing costs are significantly lower than the US. 178 It is one of the reasons that China has
been coined “the world’s factory.” 179 Moving manufacturing operations outside of China would
likely be economically irrational for these Chinese owners of US IP rights. 180 Second, the mere
fact that some of the subsidized products are manufactured abroad “does not dissolve the export
contingency arising in the first set of circumstances[]”–domestic production and subsequent
exportation. 181 Even if some protected products were manufactured outside of China, under this
holding, the Chinese acquisition of US IP rights can still be considered synonymous with export
performance.
Finally, the second element, whether the subsidy is tied to the export earnings, likely
applies to the Chinese IP subsidies. The Canada—Aircraft Panel elaborated on this element,
stating that the nature of the required conditionality is that “one of the conditions for the grant of
the subsidy is the expectation that exports will flow thereby.” 182 In ascertaining whether the
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subsidy is tied to the anticipated exportation, the Appellate Body in EC and Certain Member
States—Large Civil Aircraft, established the export inducement test, clarifying that export
contingency must be inferred from factors including the: “(i) design and structure of the measure
granting the subsidy, (ii) the modalities of operation set out in such a measure, and (iii) the
relevant factual circumstances surrounding the granting of the subsidy that provide the context
for understanding the measure’s design, structure, and modalities of operation.” 183 Various
Panels and Appellate Bodies have found different factors relevant in this analysis. One such
factor is the ratios test, wherein the ratio of export earnings with the subsidy is compared to the
situation without the subsidy. 184
As noted in previous sections, the Chinese government provides cash rewards for the
successful granting of IP rights. For example, at least one of the cash reward subsidies states that
“[a]pplicants who have obtained invention patents from the United States Patent and Trademark
Office . . . will receive a grant of 40,000 yuan each.” 185 Here, the measure enacting the subsidy is
designed and structured so that the provision of the subsidy is explicitly contingent on the
condition that an applicant have obtained a US invention patent. As discussed in above, IP rights,
such as patent rights, confer an expectation of export earnings. Thus, the measure here is
structured so that the provision of the subsidy is explicitly conditioned upon expected export
earnings.
Next, the modality of operation of the subsidy is similarly simple. In practice, Chinese
applicants who obtain a US patent are eligible for a 40,000 yuan subsidy. 186 Those who do not
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obtain a US patent are not eligible. 187 To apply for the subsidy, applicants need only submit an
application form, qualification materials, receipts, and the patent certificate. 188 Although there
are certain limits on the number of subsidies applicants are eligible for within a given year, until
they reach that amount, applicants are free to obtain this subsidy. 189 No entities may secure this
subsidy without securing the US patent right. 190 Thus, the actual operation of the subsidy works
to condition the subsidy on the anticipated export earnings.
Finally, the factual circumstances surrounding the grant of the subsidy indicate that it is
tied to export earnings. Over the past 15 years the Chinese subsidies have been in force, Chinese
exports have increased by approximately two hundred percent. 191 To be clear, there are likely
many other causes for this increase in exportation, but still, under the ratios analysis this sort of
circumstantial evidence may support that the subsidies are tied to export earnings.
Because the Chinese subsidies meet the definition of a “subsidy” under the SCM and are
contingent on export performance, Chinese subsidies granting payment to Chinese applicants
who successfully secure IP protection in the US are likely prohibited under the SCM.
ii.

The TRIPS Agreement Violation

It is unlikely that Chinese subsidies to Chinese nationals applying for domestic IP rights
would be classified as prohibited export contingent subsidies under the SCM. This is because the
domestic IP right would likely not be sufficiently “tied to” anticipated export earnings, or
because the domestic IP right would not be considered synonymous with “export earnings”.
However, by providing subsidies for Chinese nationals applying these domestic IP rights, China
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likely violates its obligations under the TRIPS Agreement. As noted above, under both the
GATT and TRIPS Agreements, member countries must abide by the principle of national
treatment. 192 The GATT defines national treatment specifically as it relates to the imposition of
trade barriers. 193 The GATT, however, lists domestic subsidies provided to domestic entities as
exceptions to the requirement that countries do not discriminate between foreign and domestic
entities in their imposition of trade barriers. 194 In carving out domestic subsidies, the GATT
allows countries to discriminate between foreign and domestic entities in granting subsidies and
implicitly acknowledges that such domestic subsidies generally violate the principle of national
treatment.
The TRIPS Agreement defines additional rules, that add to “the basic principles of GATT
1994 and . . . relevant international intellectual property agreements[.]” 195 The TRIPS Agreement
defines and requires national treatment specifically as it relates to the acquisition and
enforcement of IP rights. 196 Because it serves as a separate additional agreement, the national
treatment rules enunciated in the TRIPS Agreement do not merely restate those of the GATT but
provide for enhanced level of IP protection. 197 Unlike the GATT, the TRIPS Agreement does not
contain a domestic subsidy exception to the national treatment rule. 198 Thus, it would seem that
for acquisitions of IP, domestic subsidies provided to domestic citizens violate the rule of
national treatment promulgated by the TRIPS Agreement.
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Article 31(2)(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties allows consideration of
“an agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connection with
the conclusion of the treaty.” 199 The GATT is “an agreement relating to the [TRIPS Agreement]
made between all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the [TRIPS Agreement]” and
therefore, may be considered in interpreting the TRIPS Agreement. 200 As noted above, the
GATT proclaims the national treatment principle but includes a specific exception to immunize
domestic subsidies from being held as violations of the principle of national treatment. 201 The
TRIPS Agreement, while also proclaiming the principle of national treatment, does not include
any exceptions that immunize domestic subsidies offered in violation of this principle. 202
Therefore, by including a national treatment exception for subsidies in the GATT, which pertains
to goods, but not in the TRIPS Agreement, which pertains to IP, it seems as though subsidies for
the acquisition of IP rights are not exempted from the national treatment principle in the TRIPS
Agreement.
As noted above, the Chinese government currently provides subsidies to Chinese
nationals for their application for or acquisition of patent and trademark rights in China. 203 These
subsidies do not appear to be available to non-Chinese applicants. 204 The national treatment rules
of the TRIPS Agreement prohibit discrimination between national and foreign applicants seeking
to secure IP protection in a member country. 205 Providing subsidies to Chinese patent and
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trademark applicants while denying them to non-Chinese applicants involves discriminating
between applicants based on their nationality. Thus, the subsidies provided to the Chinese
nationals, which make acquiring Chinese IP rights more expensive for foreign applicants than
domestic applicants, violate the national treatment principles of the TRIPS Agreement.
V.

CONCLUSION

Chinese applications for patents and trademarks have exploded in number over the past
ten years. 206 To some degree, this increase in filings can be attributed to subsidy programs
offered to domestic applicants by the Chinese government. 207 These subsidies, offered for
foreign and domestic IP acquisitions, have legitimate and profound international
consequences. 208 Domestic solutions to these issues would likely require the expenditure of
additional resources from the US or other affected countries. However, by sponsoring these
subsidy programs, China disobeys national treatment principles enacted under the TRIPS
Agreement and disregards its obligations under the SCM. 209 Thus, WTO members should seek to
enforce these agreements to curb China’s continued violations.
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